Sanctions and Reality: Western Tech's Enduring Role in Russian Arms

How Western Technology Continues to Power Russian Missile Navigation Systems

The recent prisoner swap between Russia and the US was quite unexpected, not only because of its timing but also due to its inclusion of several prominent Russian opposition figures. Shortly after the exchange, these figures began calling for the lifting of sanctions on Russia, arguing for targeted measures rather than broad, blanket sanctions affecting the entire population. This sparked considerable controversy and heated debates, but our team proposes an alternative perspective. The fundamental issue is that sanctions, whether broad or targeted, fail to achieve their intended effect without proper enforcement. Loosely enforced sanctions might create temporary obstacles, but they rarely bring about significant, long-term changes.

Table of contents:

I. Shaykovka’s Missiles and Bombers

II. Broken Things Should Stay Broken

III. What’s on the Horizon?

Today, our team presents another stark example of insufficient enforcement: the integration of Western components into the navigational systems of Russian missiles, highlighting a significant gap in the effectiveness of sanctions.

A batch of documents, consisting of hundreds of pages and provided to our team by the Ukrainian cyber resistance, offers insight into the internal processes of Russian missile maintenance and parts replacement.

I. Shaykovka’s Missiles and Bombers

Hundreds of pages of confidential documents, detailed reports, and scanned schematics have led our team’s investigation to a military base in Shaykovka, Kaluga Oblast. This base houses military unit #33310, more commonly known as the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment. It gained notoriety for several incidents, including the launch of a Kh-22 missile that struck a civilian shopping center in Kremenchuk in June 2022. The information about it can be found in reports by the Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces here and the OSCE here. So how does it relate to sanctions investigation?

According to a confidential document labeled as a "technical task," it is documented that Unit #33310 (52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment) has been using the tool "SN-99" as part of the satellite navigation system in "Product 132, variant 40." It might sound complex due to the heavy use of obscure terms, but everything will become clear in a few seconds as we explain.

The term “Product 132, variant 40” is already known as a codeword for the Kh-32 missile. It’s a Russian air-launched cruise missile designed for anti-ship and land-attack roles. It is an upgraded version of the Kh-22 missile

The CH-99 (in Russian) or CN-99 (in English) is a navigation module for cruise missiles, heavily composed of Western components. In September 2022, investigators from Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a comprehensive report, including evidence and parts inspection, indicating that these navigation systems were found in Kh-59 and Kh-101 missiles. Thanks to these documents, we also know that this system is incorporated into Kh-32 missiles as well.

Screenshot of the Conflict Armament Research Report. Source: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/239f756e2e6b49a5bec78f5c5248bf3d

So, what do we know specifically about the CN-99 module and its Western components? According to the official Ukrainian "War-Sanctions" database, which contains photographic evidence of parts along with their serial numbers, we can identify the CN-99 module and the Western-made components used in it.

SN-99 navigation systems produced in March 2023 were used in missile attacks on Ukraine, and include components from several Western manufacturers: Silicon Laboratories, NXP Semiconductors, Dallas Semiconductor, SPANSION, Maxim Integrated Products, and Integrated Silicon Solution. Despite the portrayal of the SN-99 module as a domestic product, it's evident that its most critical parts are Western-made. It is highly unlikely that by 2024, Russia has developed its own domestic semiconductor production on a scale sufficient to meet its military or civilian needs.

Furthermore, the same documents reveal that the State Machine Building Design Bureau "Raduga," a Russian developer and manufacturer of missiles, has been tasked with retrofitting modernized SN-99 modules into Kh-32 missiles.

The modernization, repairs, and retrofitting are happening in cooperation between the State Machine Building Design Bureau "Raduga” and the Joint Stock Company Dubnensky Machine Building Plant named after N.P. Fedorov.

Both of these enterprises are sanctioned by many Western countries, including the United States. Unfortunately, the documents do not specifically reveal the methods Russians use to obtain parts for SN-99 navigation modules. However, it is clear that despite sanctions, Russia has continued to supply its military with the necessary electronics to maintain and enhance its weaponry, which frequently targets civilian infrastructure and results in civilian casualties across Ukrainian cities.

II. Broken Things Should Stay Broken

Sanctions are crucial not only to prevent Russia from creating new missiles but also to hinder their maintenance and repair efforts. According to a list of restoration works in non-warranty cases from an unspecified period in 2022, at least 15 Kh-32 missiles (codename 9-А-2362) produced between 2007 and 2010 were marked as defective at military base 33310. The number of defective missiles identified, according to our calculations, falls within the range of 10-15% of all used missiles on the base at the time. This is within the acceptable failure rate.

It's unclear whether the listed defective models contained any Western parts. However, as an illustrative example, the failure of specific modules can render an entire missile defective and challenging to restore. Potentially, Western components could have become a bottleneck for Russian military production, affecting everything from manufacturing machinery to missile navigation systems. However, this is not what we are seeing at present.

III. What’s on the Horizon?

After several years of war in Ukraine, it has become clear that while sanctions have inflicted some damage and created obstacles, their anticipated impact was significantly overstated. Analysts, journalists, and politicians widely assumed that once sanctions were imposed, they would be rigorously enforced. However, few anticipated that their effectiveness would be undermined by inadequate enforcement. This shortfall, whether due to a lack of political will, reluctance to harm one's own economy (potentially affecting election outcomes in democratic systems), or simply due to limited resources and understanding, has led to sanctions losing their effectiveness as a deterrent.

The presence of Western components in the SN-99 module used in Kh cruise missiles at Shaykovka is just one of many examples illustrating this issue - some of them we have previously investigated and reported. One reason why Putin was not deterred in 2022 is that he never believed the West would maintain consistent enforcement of sanctions to inflict critical damage. As a result, he perceived the potential benefits of his actions as outweighing the risks.

Without strict and ongoing enforcement, sanctions will gradually lose their effectiveness over time, reminiscent of the situation with the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014. Consequently, Russia will continue to enhance its military production and modernize its equipment with Western components, exploiting the gaps in enforcement to its advantage.