Syria Withdrawal: Implications for Ukraine and Russia
Assessment of Russia’s Withdrawal from Tartus, Potential Move to Libya, and Effects on Frontlines in Ukraine
On December 8th, after Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria fell, a new geopolitical question arose: could Russia maintain its presence in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), and if so, to what extent? Could a withdrawal lead to a significant reinforcement of Russian troops in Ukraine? Recent satellite images show Russian cargo planes at Syria’s Khmeimim Airbase being loaded with military equipment, a detail that has drawn global media attention.
Reports of multiple cargo flights between Syria, Libya and Russia, coupled with newly released high-resolution photos from Tartus naval base, add weight to the growing belief that Russia may be paring back its role in Syria to a more minimal presence, and question the extent of Moscow’s presence in the region
Contents
I. Withdrawal from Tartus
II. Destination Libya
III. Implications for the Frontline in Ukraine
IV. Assets at Risk
V. Summary
Sources
I. Withdrawal from Tartus
Tartus Naval Base, situated on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, has long served as a naval logistics hub, first for the Soviet Union and now for Russia, enabling the projection of military and geopolitical power across the Middle East, Africa, and the broader Mediterranean region. In recent years, the base has not only played a critical role in Russia’s military operations during the Syrian war but has also been implicated as a hub for transferring and selling stolen Ukrainian grain.
Satellite imagery from Maxar, dated December 17, shows an unusual concentration of vehicles at the base. Additional photos and videos of the facility obtained on the same day provided further details, allowing for a closer identification of the vehicles.
Our analysis identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 separate containers, the majority of which are unarmored transport or logistics trucks. The precise vehicle count remains uncertain, as multiple civilian vehicles were excluded from the assessment.
It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus seaport by naval vessels. Earlier reports indicated that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, both of which have previously traveled to Syria, were seen heading south alongside a Russian Navy convoy. The likely destination is Tartus.
According to Oboronlogistics, a shipping and logistics company operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Ursa Major is a universal dry cargo vessel designed to transport various types of cargo, including general cargo (both oversized and containerized), rolling equipment (such as vehicles), with a capacity of up to 1,200 tons and a cargo deck able to accommodate up to 120 units of wheeled or tracked vehicles.
Sparta is a RO-RO cargo ship which was built in 2003, has a deadweight of 6785 tons and is equipped with two cranes
Based on these characteristics, it can be concluded that most of the vehicles and container cargo can be transported by these vessels in one or two trips. Given their current speed, we can expect their arrival at Tartus within 9 to 15 days.
While it cannot be confirmed with absolute certainty that all of these vehicles are intended for evacuation, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that major ground operations by Russian forces are unlikely to occur while logistical support is stationed at the seaport. Some of the armored vehicles present are likely intended for evacuation or storage, as they are not positioned for base defense but are instead grouped together with other lined up trucks.
II. Destination Libya
At present, there is no definitive information on the final destination of the cargo. However, in recent days, our team received unconfirmed but from credible source information suggesting Libya as a likely destination for at least part of the shipment. This aligns with a recent report from unnamed CNN sources in Washington, D.C.
There are also additional indicators point to Libya as a potential recipient of some of this equipment: the cargo loaded onto Russian planes at Khmeimim Airbase was transported to areas in Libya controlled by Khalifa Haftar in the east.
While the exact contents of these shipments are unknown, the Wall Street Journal reported that radar systems for S-400 and S-300 interceptor systems were among the equipment moved.
To determine the likely destination, we examined recent activity locations of Russian forces in Libya
Throughout 2024, Russian forces were observed at multiple locations across Libya, including airbases and seaports. This map, made by the AllEyesOnWagner project, displays Russia's activities in Libya
In 2023, Russia reportedly sought access to the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk. In 2024, Tobruk port was actively used for Russian logistical operations. While Benghazi remains a potential option, it is likely that negotiations for access are ongoing.
Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army based in Tobruk, despite his close ties to the Kremlin, faces armed opposition from the Turkiye-supported Government of National Accord (GNA). Turkey has previously supplied drones to the GNA, complicating Haftar’s position. The increased Russian presence could be seen as an opportunity for Haftar to strengthen his air defense capabilities, which are crucial for countering large drones. Russia may be willing to fulfill this need, potentially providing anti-aircraft systems such as S-400 or S-300. However, such a move could provoke increased pressure from Western nations.
Frontelligence Insight has reached out to John Lechner, a researcher and expert with extensive experience in the region, including on-ground reporting from Libya and connections with sources formerly tied to the Wagner Group - for a comment on this development:
”Haftar relies on the Russians to hold the military stalemate with Turkish-backed Tripoli. But he is most interested in keeping his geopolitical options open. A greater Russian presence in Libya will hardly be convenient. It is safe to assume that during their visits to Benghazi, U.S. officials, including AFRICOM's commander, have made it clear to Haftar that a Russian naval base is a red line. And the U.S. will certainly work to make any potential Russian host's life much more difficult. The Field Marshal is between a rock and a hard place.”
Such developments could also strain Russia-Turkiye relations, as Russian aircraft frequently transit through Turkish airspace en route to Libya. Should Turkiye perceive these operations as counter to its interests in Libya, it might restrict access to its airspace for Russian military cargo.
Our calculations suggest that an IL-76 cargo plane, with cargo onboard, may face problems flying directly to Libya without Turkish airspace access. This would likely compel Moscow to explore alternative routes, potentially requiring on-ground refueling in countries like Iran. Previously, Russia used Khmeimim Airbase in Syria as a logistical midpoint for operations between Russia and Africa. However, the future viability of Khmeimim for such purposes is now uncertain.
Overall, our team assesses that while Russia may increase its presence in Libya, it's premature to assert that Russia is fully and permanently moving its fleet and personnel from Syria to Libya. Khalifa Haftar's geopolitical position remains complicated, forcing him to be quite careful with such decisions in order to retain a certain balance. Meanwhile, Syria’s new government may still require foreign backing, such as Russia’s, to counterbalance other powerful factions within the country. For these reasons, it would be premature to entirely write off Russia’s role or presence in Syria.