Summer 2024 Frontline Dynamics: Overview, Key Issues, and Projections

As global attention remains focused on the U.S. Presidential elections, it might seem that the frontline situation has stalled with no significant changes. However, our team has prepared a special report after closely monitoring the movement and composition of Russian forces, assessing their morale, and analyzing captured documentation and POW statements. Additionally, we've observed both positive and concerning developments within the Ukrainian army. This comprehensive report aims to clarify the current status on the frontline and offer insights into what we can expect moving forward. We have also addressed the question of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, exploring the feasibility of such talks in the near future and identifying the reasons why they would be difficult to execute.

Contents:

I. Critical Areas: Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions

II. Recruitment, Equipment, and Morale in Ukraine and Russia
a) Russia’s Position
b) Ukraine’s Position

III. Forecast

IV. Potential for Negotiations and Enforcement Approaches

I. Critical Areas: Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions

Earlier, we reported that the offensive towards Kharkiv was unlikely to shift the main focus from Donbas, which indeed remained the primary focus of Russian forces. Between June and July, Russian troops made progress in several areas, notably in Niu-York, Toretsk, and the Pokrovsk direction.

The advances in Niu-York and Toretsk were unexpected for our team and the officers stationed there, as there were few concerns about potential Russian movements in these areas. After interviewing multiple officers and soldiers, we concluded that these advancements resulted from a lack of coordination and poor command decisions, similar to those made by the Ukrainian command during the rotation in Ocheretyne in the spring of 2024.

Interestingly, the command of the 41st Mechanized Brigade (Ukraine), which was rotated to Chasiv Yar before moving to the Toretsk area, bears the lion's share of the blame for the loss of the canal district in Chasiv Yar and the Toretsk-Niu York area. In both cases, the Russians were able to advance within their areas of responsibility. Some officers we spoke to even suggested that the Russians are tracking the rotation of the 41st Brigade to exploit vulnerabilities in their command and cooperation during rotations, however, we cannot independently verify or deny this claim.

Conversely, according to multiple sources, the brigade did not have a chance to replenish its losses after the Kupyansk direction and was subsequently sent to Chasiv Yar and then to the Toretsk area. While the brigade command can be blamed for mistakes, the underlying issues are much more fundamental. These include a lack of rest, shortages of personnel and equipment, and insufficient reserves to send to risky areas, leading to the redeployment of brigades from other parts of the frontline.

Despite these challenges, not everything is negative for the Ukrainian army. Early in the spring of 2024, when the Russians were advancing towards Chasiv Yar, the situation for Ukrainian forces was quite dire. They faced a shortage of artillery shells, delays in Western aid, and a lack of personnel. Additionally, they had to contend with a concentration of a large number of Russian brigades, mostly VDV. These factors put Ukrainian units in a very difficult position, resulting in the loss of multiple tactical positions.

Yet, as we approach August, Russian forces have still not been able to advance beyond the water channel that separates the town of Chasiv Yar from the Canal district on the eastern side. Based on some POW statements, which should be taken with a grain of salt, the main offensive operation was put on hold after initial failures. While Russian assaults have continued, their intensity has been less than expected, given the allegedly concentrated resources in the area. These resources might still be utilized for a larger offensive operation later this year.

Given this context, Chasiv Yar remains in a very dangerous position, and we may see Russian progress beyond the canal. Chasiv Yar might still eventually fall into Russian hands unless major changes in recruitment and foreign supplies are made.

Despite the serious problems in the Ukrainian army, such as a shortage of personnel, Ukrainian forces have managed to hold Chasiv Yar and inflict sufficiently high losses to compel the enemy to concentrate its main efforts elsewhere, specifically in the Pokrovsk area.

A much more dangerous situation, which we would characterize as "critical," remains in the direction of Pokrovsk. Unfortunately, Russian forces have advanced several kilometers deep towards Pokrovsk, coming close to Myrnohrad and Hrodivka—gateway towns to Pokrovsk. This area is a crucial logistical hub for Ukrainian forces, not only for Avdiivka but also for Kurakhove areas. Our team will provide a detailed analysis of this area in a separate report.

II. Recruitment, Equipment, and Morale in Ukraine and Russia

Assessing the current state of personnel, equipment, and morale for both Ukraine and Russia is challenging, given that factors like morale are difficult to quantify and exact equipment numbers are not fully available. Despite these limitations, our team has gathered multi-sourced evidence from documents, individual reports, and recordings, which, while fragmentary, provide insight into key trends. Here are the main observations:

a) Russia's Position:

• Equipment Movements and Availability: During June and early July, our team observed the movement of hundreds of vehicles from various parts of Russia toward Ukraine. Most of these vehicles were older models, likely restored and, in some cases, modernized, such as T-62s, T-55s, BMP-1s, and BTR-70/80s, with very few MTLBs. These vehicles have not yet made a noticeable appearance on the battlefield, suggesting they may either be assigned to new units being formed by the Russian army or are intended for future use later this year.
  
  According to internal Russian documents in our possession, many damaged tanks have been waiting for parts replacements for over six months. Specific components, particularly those from the engine compartment, appear to be the most problematic, leading to extended waiting times. In some cases, shortages of engines for tanks like the T-80 have resulted in cannibalization of these tanks rather than fixing them, due to the unrealistically long wait for parts.
  

• Morale Issues. Audio interceptions and individual Russian reports indicate seriously lowered morale among Russian forces, with infantry units showing signs of exhaustion. Some advancing Russian units have reportedly simulated communication problems to avoid further commands. In other instances, unit commanders have falsely claimed to face strong resistance and overwhelming force as a pretext for retreat. This pattern of behavior mirrors issues observed before, particularly after the defeat near Vuhledar in 2023, when units began sabotaging orders due to low morale. While this does not imply that Russian forces will cease their advances, the noticeable fatigue is unlikely to be resolved in the near months.
  

• Recruitment. Overall, Russia continues to recruit a sufficient number of recruits; however, there are some evident problems. To meet recruitment quotas, Russian local governments have significantly increased sign-up bonuses, some of which have nearly quintupled compared to 2022 and 2023. For instance, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin signed a decree granting Moscow residents a one-time payment of 1.9 million rubles ($21,777) upon signing a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry. Similar measures have been implemented in other regions; in Volgograd, the sign-up bonus has reached 800,000 rubles (slightly over $9,000).

  To put this in perspective, the median monthly salary in Russia in July 2023 was 53,571 rubles ($591.90), meaning that the sign-up bonus exceeds the median annual income in Russia. Regarding age and demographics, the median age of Russian soldiers has significantly increased. While a full report with more details is scheduled for next week, we can already say that the median age of Russian soldiers continues to increase as the war progresses. This trend indicates growing shortages among the younger demographic pool.

  

  Russian recruitment poster

• Considering that monthly losses of vehicles far exceed replacement figures for nearly all types of vehicles, including attack helicopters, tanks, and IFVs, it is unlikely that Russia can sustain frequent large-scale offensive operations for years to come. This does not mean that Russia is running out of vehicles or will cease advancing altogether. With assistance from North Korea, Iran, and partially China, Russia can continue to sustain localized, company-sized offensives and maintain control over newly occupied territories. Occasionally, they may launch larger operations; however, it remains unclear whether Russia will achieve significant enough goals to internally justify the ongoing war and the associated losses, including the worsening economic well-being of regular citizens.
  

  b) Ukraine's Position:
  

• Recruitment and distribution. Based on our conversations with multiple sources across the Ukrainian military, the most acute problem they report is the lack of new recruits or trained recruits. At least one representative from a mechanized brigade told us that their brigade hasn't received a single new person recently. While we can't independently verify this statement, many of our sources indicate that the number of new recruits is insufficient even to cover basic requirements. This shortage forces brigades to cover kilometers of the frontline with only a squad-sized force.
  
  Allegedly, based on a few anecdotal reports, many newly mobilized individuals are being directed to newly organized brigades. If this information is correct—which we cannot confirm or deny—it raises questions about the purpose of forming new units when existing units are already understaffed. The core of any unit consists of experienced sergeants and officers who can act as a backbone and ensure that the unit remains combat-ready even after sustaining losses.
  
  During the summer 2023 counter-offensive, newly formed brigades were unable to achieve their goals in the South, despite being trained abroad and better armed by the West. On top of the brigades created in 2022 and 2023, new brigades are now being formed. Given that there are no known plans for the West to seriously arm more of these newly formed brigades, the validity of such a decision remains questionable. Instead of forming new units, it might be more effective to supply existing brigades with the necessary personnel.

• Western Aid. When it comes to shells, armaments, and vehicles, Ukraine is heavily reliant on the West, especially the United States. The ongoing elections in the US and increasing fatigue among the Western public regarding Russia's war in Ukraine make it difficult to build a reliable strategy or prognosis for how well-armed and equipped the Ukrainian army will be in a year. It is also uncertain whether the supplies provided by the West will be sufficient to offset Ukrainian losses on the battlefield.
  

  To put it simply, neither current rates of recruitment in Ukraine nor Western supplies for Ukraine are sufficient for Ukraine to win or at least liberate territories back to the February 2022 borders. Additionally, Ukraine still requires more air defense units to protect its vulnerable infrastructure from missile strikes. Current supplements are insufficient to ensure protection from Russian missiles and glide bombs, resulting in further destruction of the electric grid and production facilities.
  

• The destruction of the electric grid and civilian infrastructure poses a significant problem. Long-hour blackouts, sometimes lasting over 12 hours, severely impact any industrialized society, especially in larger cities where people live in apartment buildings rather than individual houses. While there is a threshold for how long this can continue without serious socio-political and economic consequences, it is incorrect to assume it can persist indefinitely. The delivery of F-16s is unlikely to resolve this issue entirely. While they may intercept certain types of missiles, such as cruise missiles, other missiles will remain difficult targets. Bombers, submarines, and ships launching missiles are located deep within Russia, avoiding confrontation with the Ukrainian air force. The number of Patriot systems required to cover infrastructural, governmental, and important military targets far exceeds the number currently committed to Ukraine. These systems also require constant ammunition refills, making Ukraine heavily dependent on the production capacities and political will of the West, which has proven to be inconsistent during this war.

III. Forecast

It is unlikely that Russia will halt active offensive operations before mid-fall 2024. Despite fatigue and losses, they have sufficient forces to maintain pressure, particularly in the Donetsk Oblast. However, the remaining forces, reserves, and units currently undergoing training in Voronezh, Belgorod, and Rostov Oblasts suggest that Russia lacks the resources to lay siege to major Ukrainian settlements such as Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Without these cities, Russia cannot claim to have fully achieved its goal of occupying the entire Donbas region. We also do not exclude the possibility that Ukrainian forces might use new brigades to launch a counter-attack once Russia exhausts its offensive potential. However, this would be an extremely risky endeavor in the current situation. Overall, neither Ukraine nor Russia can achieve their strategic goals with the currently available resources. In an effort to strengthen its position ahead of potential negotiations, Moscow has intensified its campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, particularly targeting energy facilities, as noted earlier in the report. Additionally, a massive and effective online campaign has been launched to exaggerate internal problems and shift the blame from Russia to Ukrainian authorities for the lack of basic services and economic issues, which are actually the result of Russian actions


This brings us to one of the most common questions: why don't Russia and Ukraine just sit at the negotiation table and resolve the war?

IV. Potential for Negotiations and Enforcement Approaches

Setting aside various political aspects, the situation is much more complicated due to the lack of effective mechanisms for such negotiations.

North Korean Army officers and U.S. military representatives initial maps defining the future Demilitarized Zone or DMZ at Panmunjom, October 1951. (U.S. Air Force photo)

For instance, during the Korean War, the Korean Armistice Agreement established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and ceased hostilities. A key factor in maintaining this armistice was the presence of US forces, which served as a strong deterrent against another North Korean invasion. Currently, no key countries with significant economic and military power are ready to commit troops on the ground to enforce a similar agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

If we assume that Ukraine and the Russian government could reach an agreement similar to the Korean armistice, where no nation is a signatory and it is purely a military document, the question remains: who would enforce or punish violations of such an agreement? Any law or agreement that cannot be enforced by a third party lacks real power and is therefore extremely risky.

If such a deal involves the retraction of heavy weaponry from a "demilitarized zone," a critical question arises: which institution or organization will ensure that the Russian army moves back its heavy weaponry? If Russia fails to comply, what mechanisms are in place to punish such actions?

Without a reliable enforcement mechanism, any agreement would be inherently unstable. Should Ukraine withdraw its forces without credible security guarantees, Russia could potentially take over positions without facing consequences. This scenario would deter the Ukrainian side from agreeing to such conditions. Serious security guarantees from third parties such as the EU or the US would be essential.

In other words, the Ukrainian government and society are being asked to trust the word of Putin's regime that they will not violate an armistice agreement, despite multiple violations of previous agreements and two invasions with territorial annexations over the past decade.

Unfortunately, this leads to the conclusion that if the West is reluctant to provide sufficient aid for Ukraine to win this war, a new and robust security mechanism needs to be established. Without such a mechanism, the war is likely to continue. This may occur in a less intensive manner or with temporary ceasefires, only to be resumed, creating a perpetual conflict zone in Europe. Such a scenario would continue to cost hundreds of thousands of lives and inflict severe socio-political and economic consequences on the region. Without credible and enforceable guarantees, the cycle of conflict is unlikely to be broken.