Russian forces have achieved tactical gains near Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar, and have launched a significant assault towards Sivers'k. Ukrainian forces are encountering numerous challenges but have managed to prevent a collapse of the frontline despite the challenging circumstances. In this report, the Frontelligence Insight team provides a comprehensive analysis outlining significant frontline developments, including the potential for a Russian offensive into Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.
CONTENTS
I. Chasiv Yar
II. Ocheretyne
III. Sivers'k - Bilohorivka
IV. Kharkiv offensive
V. Summary
I. Chasiv Yar
Russian forces are continuing to make incremental tactical gains, primarily focusing on identifying weak points in defenses through the deployment of small tactical groups. Notably, they have achieved more success in the southern flank compared to the northern flank, where their forces are encountering more challenges. Ground reports indicate that multiple Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar without establishing a bridgehead, subsequently being either destroyed or forced to retreat. A geolocated video analysis from the map.ukrdailyupdate project reveals Russian attempts to establish a position south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing.
The concentration of superior Russian forces in the area raises significant concerns. Without effective stabilization measures, Russian forces will leverage their numerical advantage to breach the canal and establish a bridgehead in the forest on the western side. This move would enable them to advance and choose assault directions more freely. The intact forest would allow Russians to utilize foliage for covert movement and positioning, allowing infiltration into different sectors of the town. If successful, defending Chasiv Yar in an organized manner would become exceedingly challenging.
Losing control of the southern part of Chasiv Yar would have serious implications, as it would open the road leading directly to Kostyantynivka, with only the small village of Stupochky as an obstacle in the path. However, this is not the sole concern. An important route for Russian forces would be the northern road from Chasiv Yar to Kostyantynivka, especially given the current warm weather conditions that make the series of dirt roads passable. Essentially, if Chasiv Yar were to fall, Russian forces could advance simultaneously toward the flanks of Kostyantynivka, creating a challenging situation for defenders who would find themselves at a disadvantage relative to the advancing forces from higher ground.
II. Ocheretyne area
The DeepStateMap project has indicated on its map that Ukrainian positions northwest of Ocheretyne are under Russian control. However, Frontelligence Insight has received conflicting information regarding the accuracy of these territorial gains at the time of this analysis. If we were to assume that these gains are indeed accurate, it raises significant concerns because it opens a pathway to Novooleksandrivka, with a relatively short distance of approximately 10 kilometers remaining between current Russian positions and the road connecting Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The specific danger posed by this road is that it runs almost the entire way unopposed through fields from Ocheretyne to areas south of Kostyantynivka, with only one or two settlements in between. This road provides Russians with multiple direction options and enables them to expand their area of operation, thereby reducing the risk of being encircled or trapped by Ukrainian forces in the event of a counter-attack.
The Russian expansion into Arkhangel's'ke widens their range of possibilities and complicates Ukrainian efforts to establish a cohesive defensive system across such a broad area, particularly given the understaffing of many brigades.
Our team compared satellite imagery from April 22nd and May 1st to identify new scorch marks left by artillery, airstrikes, or other projectiles. Based on our findings, it is evident that Russian efforts are focused on the western and northern directions which suggest they are likely to attempt to exploit this road north of Ocheretyne as well.
III. Sivers'k - Bilohorivka
In the Bilohorivka-Siversk direction, over the past 48 hours, the enemy has launched multiple assaults from various directions, supported by a series of KAB strikes. Ground reports indicate that approximately 8 KAB hits occurred within 30 minutes. These assaults were repelled
Specifically, in the drone photo above, the 6th separate motor rifle brigade of the second army corps attempted an assault towards Spirne, located south of Bilohorivka. The assault included 1 tank and 3 MTLBs carrying infantry. As a result, only one MTLB survived and fled, while the other vehicles and infantry were destroyed.
IV. Kharkiv offensive?
In our previous analysis, we identified that Russian forces have approximately two corps stationed along the border of Sumy and Kharkiv. There has been speculation about whether Russia intends to enter Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, and it's important to clarify key details.
Firstly, we have not observed the formation of a concentrated force capable of conducting a deep strike. Instead, we see scattered units that could potentially assemble into a striking force in the future, although this is not evident at present.
The current number of forces is inadequate for an operation against cities like Kharkiv or even Sumy. Forces of a similar size were used to capture Avdiivka, a town with a pre-war population of around 30,000, which is vastly smaller than Kharkiv's population of nearly one and a half million.
Based on the information available to us, these units primarily consist of infantry and lack sufficient numbers of tanks and other armored vehicles for a deep maneuver. Therefore, any activity against Ukrainian forces in Sumy and Kharkiv is likely to be predominantly artillery and infantry-based and not comparable to the initial invasion phase seen in 2022.
Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, suggests that Russia’s northern grouping, located across the border from Kharkiv, currently consists of 35,000 troops but is expected to expand to between 50,000 and 70,000 troops. This aligns with our earlier estimates of the force approximately equivalent to 2 Russian corps in the area. Skibitsky anticipates that Russia's main offensive will commence "at the end of May or beginning of June."
The threat posed by their increased presence should not be underestimated, as they gradually continue to deploy additional forces and may suddenly form a striking force at any time. However, as we mentioned before, the current force levels are insufficient to conduct a significant maneuver deep into Ukrainian territory.
Summary
The frontline situation remains complex, but efforts are underway to stabilize it, with the expected arrival of Western ammunition aimed at improving conditions. Although Russian forces are making gains, there are no signs of a collapse in the frontline. While the tactical gains may seem minor, their accumulation could lead to operational success. The objective is to execute a multi-echelon double-pincer maneuver.
The smaller pincer is targeting the isolation of forces south of Bakhmut, focusing on Klischiivka, while the larger pincer aims to encircle a larger grouping of forces, focusing on the T0504 Highway and the encirclement of Kostyantynivka. Ukraine has the capability to slow down and potentially halt the Russian advance, but this may come at the cost of losing several settlements.
Despite strategic and operational planning challenges, senior officers and soldiers at the tactical level are demonstrating personal initiative to address the situation. For example, individual officers and soldiers are securing machinery from charity funds and volunteers to construct defenses. They are also conducting ad-hoc training sessions for new soldiers who did not receive adequate training in official facilities.
Many of these assaults have been countered with infantry supported by FPV (First Person View) drones, with ammunition still being produced in makeshift workshops. Innovative methods to bypass electronic warfare (EW) or extend the FPV flight range are being developed and shared among soldiers.
Overall, due to ground-level efforts driven by personal initiative among brigade officers, soldiers, and sergeants, along with the anticipated Western aid and undisclosed stabilization measures, there is hope for improvement in the situation.