After the capture of Avdiivka by Russian forces, they seized the opportunity to advance their assault westward. Frontelligence Insight conducted an in-depth analysis using satellite imagery, open-source data, and various resources to provide key observations on the situation in that area. Additionally, the analysis offers insights into what to anticipate in the near future.
Avdiivka Retreat
While some observers suggest a timely withdrawal from Avdiivka, our assessment indicates that initiating the retreat earlier could have reduced losses. An earlier retreat would have averted situations where troops faced breaking through envelopments at an undesirable cost or leaving the wounded without evacuation, akin to the infamous Zenith case. It's worth noting that the decision to retreat from Avdiivka was made more promptly than in Bakhmut in 2023, showing some improvement.
Thanks to the highly professional actions of the 3rd assault brigade, as well as other special units, a passage for certain retreating units was organized, facilitating a retreat while inflicting substantial losses on the pursuing enemy. However, some individuals we interviewed mentioned not receiving official retreat orders, and the decision to retreat was based on tactical necessity rather than a formal order. Waiting for official orders might have exposed them to encirclement and destruction, although our team cannot assess the extent of this occurrence.
Rapid Advances
Following the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces continued to advance. As of this analysis, settlements such as Sjeverne, Lastochkyne, and Stepove are already under Russian control. Others, including Orlivka and Berdychi, are currently contested, with the possibility that, by the time of this analysis's publication, they may already be taken or a significant part occupied.
As shown in the satellite image from February 27th, fires, and scorch marks extend beyond Orlivka, suggesting a rapid effort by Russian forces to sever communications with the settlement and inflict damage on defenders. Additionally, reports indicate that Semenivka is under attack with KAB (Guided air-dropped bomb).
This assertion is also backed by FIRMS data from NASA - Fire Information for Resource Management System, which identifies and maps "thermal anomalies" on the ground. Utilizing this data, we have created a visual representation of the image, depicting "thermal anomalies" like fires or explosions over the past 24 hours.
Overall, our team anticipates that the defense of these settlements may not be sustained for an extended period. The presence of water bodies and terrain further west provides Ukrainian forces with opportunities to secure more advantageous positions for easier defense.
Fortifications and Defense
Frontelligence Insight observes a notable deficiency in robust fortifications fortified with concrete and wooden structures on the Ukrainian side. Repeated reports indicate that brigades actively involved in combat are tasked with constructing these fortifications in their rears.
This approach is risky and even harmful, especially considering the acknowledged shortage of personnel on the frontlines for Ukrainian forces. Engaging combat-active brigades in fortification construction diverts valuable human resources away from critical combat roles. The construction of strategic defensive positions demands a complex and professional approach, extending beyond military efforts alone. Specialized equipment and assets such as bulldozers, excavators, hydraulic cranes, concrete production facilities, trucks, and resources like wood, along with logistics for their transportation to the frontlines, are a basic need. Given the scale of required constructions, Ukrainian forces lack sufficient engineering capabilities and resources to undertake this independently. Consequently, addressing this issue demands political will and the involvement of national leadership to mobilize civilian resources. Additionally, joint efforts with the Ministry of Defense are necessary to secure the resources needed for the procurement of such a serious project, especially considering existing budgetary constraints within the military budget.
This observation is not mere speculation; our team closely monitored the construction of fortification lines in the South by Russian forces. During that period, the Russian military actively engaged subcontracted civilian companies from Russia and occupied territories to secure construction resources, vehicles, operators, and logistical support. Moreover, to compensate for deficiencies, Russia used stolen and “confiscated” civilian equipment. This approach was coupled with a collaborative effort between military and civilian authorities in Russia, involving active participation from collaborators in the occupied territories. Despite numerous complaints regarding funds embezzlement, product quality, and various other challenges, the overall project proved to be successful.
The Near Prospects
Our team observes that due to relatively dry weather, the fields are rapidly drying up, facilitating the advance of Russian forces. Contrary to some anticipations that the muddy season might impede their progression, unfortunately, that is not the case at this moment. While the situation for the Ukrainian side is challenging for various reasons, such as ammunition and manpower shortages, inadequately prepared defensive positions, and other factors, the outlook for the Russian side is not necessary very optimistic. Here are some key points regarding the situation of Russian forces advancing across the frontline:
Russian forces incurred disproportionately high losses during the assault on Avdiivka. Based on our team's geospatial observations, the estimated number of lost vehicles by the Russian side during the Avdiivka assault exceeds ~300. OSINT analyst Naalsio, who estimates losses based on video and photo evidence, confirms that over ~600 vehicles have been damaged, destroyed, abandoned, or later recovered. Estimating personnel losses is more challenging, but the overall number of irreversible losses, as provided by the now-deceased Russian military blogger Morozov, who committed suicide after being compelled to delete his post about losses, is reported to be 16 thousand people.
Intercepted communication data, which our team had the opportunity to review, indicates that many units actively engaged in combat since the summer of 2023 are demoralized due to high losses, incorrect salary payments, insufficient rotations, and a careless attitude from senior officers and particularly generals. Some smaller units at the platoon to company level are refusing to participate in combat. However, it's important to note that the Russian military has an effective, extrajudicial system to address such behavior, creating only temporary problems for them and should not be considered a critical situation for the overall force.
The quality of new recruits continues to deteriorate. As previously reported, in the final phase of the battle for Avdiivka, a group of POWs captured in February had been recruited in mid-January. This suggests hasty efforts to meet objectives by deploying available human resources despite a lack of adequate training. While the high burn rate of fresh recruits may not have an immediate impact on the Russian army, it is anticipated to significantly affect their combat readiness in the months to come.
Despite setbacks in fortification construction timelines, it would be incorrect to claim that no progress has been made at all. Engineering units are actively involved in ongoing efforts to prepare defensive positions, incorporating a mix of wood, concrete, and metal constructions in some instances. Our analysis indicates the insufficient scale of these efforts, resulting in a shortage of engineering units, equipment, and personnel, stems from a lack of coordinated national-scale initiatives. This implies that Russian forces are likely to encounter these defenses at some point, and it remains uncertain whether they will be able to achieve a breakthrough and encirclement of another large settlement.
Summary:
The situation for Ukrainian forces remains very difficult, marked by a multitude of factors such as delayed mobilization efforts, insufficient fortification construction, missteps during the 2023 campaign, and notably, a critical failure of partners to deliver promised ammunition despite previous commitments. As our team highlighted in December, Ukraine will likely experience further territorial losses, particularly in areas gained during the summer of 2023. However, we do not foresee a complete collapse of the front, as Russian forces continue to expend resources disproportionately for relatively minor gains. Despite attempting to maximize advantages in the most favorable situation since 2022, their progress lacks the necessary scale to cause a collapse of Ukrainian forces. This suggests that after exhausting their offensive potential, they will be compelled to adopt a defensive stance – a scenario that could work in Ukraine's favor if the West provides sufficient military aid to back up Ukrainian mobilization efforts.
Looking back the trajectory since September 2022, I think Kremlin's decision to mobilize personnel and construction capabilities was sensible. They could not only replenish seriously degraded forces but also could rotate, and use those rotated perosonnel or mobiks as a labor for fortification - what Ukrainians should do now.
Some can say Ukranians have no national capability to construct those lines because they lack resources, but that's the reason why Ukraine should concentrate their limited resources even more sensibly than Russians.
And still the great question stands.
Why the senseless attempt to attack in Zaprozhiya oblast in the summer, instead of using the recourses to threat Russian territories along the north border?
There were only minor attempts with inferior forces and small attack groups.
It is a mystery for me.