Overview of the Operational and Tactical Situation in Ukraine
From Kharkiv to Zaporizhzhia
As the year of 2024 comes to a close, the situation remains as difficult as it was at the end of 2023, when Russian forces were assaulting Avdiivka, gradually dismantling Ukrainian defenses from the flanks. Has anything significantly changed since then? Yes and no. Beyond the obvious advantages in manpower, air power (particularly the use of KAB-guided munitions) and the ability to concentrate fire, there has been a shift in Russian tactics, one that emphasizes even smaller infantry groups than before.
In practice, Russian forces are now deploying tiny units, sometimes as few as two soldiers, to probe for weaknesses in Ukrainian lines. When they identify a vulnerability, they signal for larger reinforcements, often platoon- or company-sized units. Until such gaps are found, however, these small groups, sometimes using motorcycles, continue their repetitive efforts, probing for openings and exhausting defenders. Moscow can afford to lose these small units daily, as the steady influx of new soldiers ensures that the pressure never lets up. Our team has also learned that in several areas along the front, newly recruited Russian soldiers are sent straight into combat, with more experienced troops waiting in reserve to secure positions once they are captured. This approach helps mitigate casualties among the more valuable, seasoned soldiers, preserving them for critical operations.
This factor is key to understanding the slow but steady progress of Russian forces, even when it seems they must start running low on manpower soon. With that in mind, let’s turn to the current state of the frontlines.
Contents
I. Pokrovsk Direction
II. Chasiv Yar
III. Kupyansk, the Southern Front, and Brief Summary of the Overall Situation
I. Pokrovsk Direction
The Pokrovsk direction, previously known as Avdiivka, remains one of the most intense and contested areas of the theater. Following Russian inability to seize the city directly, as seen in similar maneuvers like in Novohrodivka, Russian forces have turned to a familiar tactic: flanking maneuvers. Notably, their advances south of Pokrovsk have yielded gains, facilitated by the fall of Selydove.
The fall of Shevchenko expands Russia's tactical options, potentially accelerating their advances along the flanks. With this key position is now getting lost, Russian forces are no longer hindered from pushing closer to Pokrovsk's southern flank, raising the likelihood of further advances in the coming weeks.
A particularly worrying development observed by our team is the increasing effort by Russian forces to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk. Using FPV drones, they have begun attempting to exert fire control over the supply routes. Reports from the ground to our team indicate that Russian units have successfully deployed FPV drones equipped with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway, which links Pokrovsk to Dnipro. This is a serious threat to the resupply process of Pokrovsk, potentially threatening the sustainability of Ukrainian defenses in the area.
Reports from eyewitnesses on the ground indicate an alarming increase in Russian FPV drone attacks targeting civilians and civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk area:
December 2: An FPV drone struck a civilian car traveling on the Udachne-Pokrovsk route, leaving the driver and passengers injured.
December 3 (morning): Another FPV drone targeted a civilian car on the Kotlyne-Pokrovsk route, resulting in the death of the driver.
December 3 (later): A garbage truck in Zvirove, near Pokrovsk, was also struck by an FPV drone. The driver survived but sustained injuries.
The underlying issues contributing to such developmens remain unchanged: persistent problems that have lingered for months, if not a year. These include inadequate coordination at both the operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels, a chronic shortage of personnel within units, and insufficient troop rotations, with some units experiencing none at all. Even the construction of heavily fortified positions has proven inadequate, as defenses falter without sufficient manpower to hold them.
As outlined in the opening of this report, while Ukrainian forces often demonstrate higher motivation, better training, and tactical agility, the nature of Russian tactics remains a problem. By employing small, continuous assaults, Russian troops eventually expose and exploit weak points in Ukrainian defenses - particularly where reserve forces are insufficient for rotation. Once a position is breached, Russian units move quickly to reinforce and expand their foothold, perpetuating the cycle.
Although this approach results in significant Russian casualties - losses widely considered unsustainable over the long term, it has proven effective in the short to medium term. This pressure has enabled Russian forces to take over operationally critical strongholds, including Vuhledar and Avdiivka.
The Russian advance south of Pokrovsk has had broader implications, enabling Russian advances towards Kurakhove.
Previously, advancing on Kurakhove from the east proved quite problematic for Russian forces, as the combination of well-prepared Ukrainian defensive positions and unfavorable geography between Marinka and Kurakhove made advances very costly and difficult. Kurakhove’s vulnerability from the north has always been a concern, as control over the nearby lake would allow Russian forces to establish a fire control over the town's supply routes. Unfortunately, this scenario has become a reality. As Russians are taking over Kurakhove they are creating additional options to push further into Zaporizhia Oblast.
That said, a string of small settlements along the road leading from Kurakhove to Zaporizhia oblast could become a problem - if Ukrainian forces can organize and effectively man their defenses. This might be a problem for Ukraine though, as Ukraine has struggled with systemic issues in operational coordination and troop deployment in the past.