Lingering Menace: Military Transformations in Belarus, Russian Presence, and Implications for Ukraine
Occasionally, the media discusses a potential invasion of Kyiv by Russia from the Belarusian side or even in coordination with the Belarusian army, leading to various speculations. To provide clarity, The Frontelligence Insight has partnered with Rochan Consulting, an aerospace and defense consulting firm, to address questions such as whether the Russian army is preparing for another assault on Kyiv in the near future, what Belarus has been up to in the past two years, and the legitimacy of speculations regarding a Round 2 invasion from Belarus.
The Belarusian Armed Forces – the old and the new
On the surface, the Belarusian Armed Forces have not undergone profound changes since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022. Efforts to modernize the force have been slow, and we have seen no increases in the number of military personnel. Minsk's hawkish rhetoric does not correspond with the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces, which remains defensive. But changes within the Belarusian military are occurring. Although they are not focused on flashy acquisitions, they are perhaps more important to the country's survival in future wars.
Training
Since around mid-2022, the Belarusian Ground Forces left home garrisons and basically never came back. Although this is a bit of an overstatement, the point is that they have constantly been training. Pre-war, Belarusians hardly ever conducted battalion-level exercises. Even during the protests following the 2020 presidential elections, when the armed forces were placed on a high readiness status, they conducted only small-level drills. We have seen multiple marches, company- and battalion-level exercises practicing high-tempo operations involving artillery and aviation. Combined-arms operations are still a problem due to a lack of well-trained and equipped air force and deficiencies in the officer's corps. Yet, despite this, Belarusians conducted brigade-level drills, which had never occurred previously. More importantly, in September 2023, Minsk launched the first-ever bilateral exercise when they placed one operational command against the other (Belarus has two operational commands: Western and Northwestern, while the third, the Southern Operational Command, is being stood up). During the drills, involved forces paid particular attention to the issues of command post redeployment (either based on the "Command Post Relocation Plan" or as a response to the actions of the adversary) and shortening the decision-making process to reduce the time between detecting and destroying targets of the mock enemy.
Due to the bilateral character of the exercise, it seems highly likely that opposing forces actively worked to improve camouflage and concealment techniques. We assess that the exercise scenario was a practical implementation of lessons the Russian Armed Forces learned during the war in Ukraine. In particular, Ukraine successfully targeted Russian command posts of various command levels, influencing the exercise's objectives and purpose.
Indeed, lessons learned from Russian experiences in the war in Ukraine are continually being implemented into the Belarusian military curricula. The focus is now placed on trench and urban warfare and the use of UAVs, both in reconnaissance and strike roles.
Mobilization readiness
During the fall of 2022, Minsk started a mass data check of Belarusian citizens liable for military service. All males aged 18-65 were called up to their Military Commissariats, with their contact data verified and updated. They also received information on which unit to report to in case of armed forces mobilization. At the same time, Minsk introduced call-ups via SMS. Previously, a call-up was to be delivered by post or a courier. Now, troops are mobilized almost instantly, significantly increasing the country's mobilization readiness. In fact, from this point of view, Belarus is now probably the best-prepared country in Europe to quickly mass forces, irrespective of how well prepared or equipped they could be. Officially, data of 96% of males was verified, but the real number is likely smaller. But it is crucial to note that no man will leave the country during a mobilization if he has not visited the military commissariat beforehand. In this context, the Belarusian General Staff determines who can leave the country and who cannot. The Russian scenario where many men left the country quickly after the mobilization was announced will not occur in Belarus.
Belarus Armed Forces now have a three-tier structure. The first includes operational forces (regular army), the second is Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), and the last is People's Militia.
The TDF was established in 2011, but its development was neglected for many years. The Russian attack on Ukraine reinvigorated the force, which now includes regular call-ups for exercises and various readiness exercises. The idea behind the organization of territorial defense was to relieve the armed forces of tasks unrelated to their operational activities, such as infrastructure protection.
Territorial defense units are deployed under conditions of external threat to state security and during war. Territorial defense troops consist of military units and subunits. The structure and number of troops are subject to approval by the President of Belarus.
The last addition to the Belarusian defense posture is the People's Militia. Its main idea is to engage citizens not covered by military duty or reservists in the armed forces without a mobilization posting to the country's defense. This type of idea, combined with the existing territorial defense, can be compared in some ways to the concept of national defense known in the Scandinavian and Baltic states. According to Belarus' Defence Minister, the establishment of the civil militia resulted from two factors: "First, it is to create additional conditions for maintaining law and order during martial law in the areas that the internal affairs authorities and the army will least cover. And these are mainly our rural settlements and individual regional cities. The second factor is to allow our citizens, who will not be covered by mobilization, to participate in the country's defense.
The process of forming militia units is checked by tests on the occasion of military exercises. So far, militia units have been formed in the Borisov and Klimavichy areas, among others, while the size of the force could reach as many as 150,000 men.
Defence budget
In early 2023, Minsk confirmed new data on defense spending. In 2023, it increased by BYN1 billion, which is more than 60% compared to 2022. Consequently, Belarusian defense spending increased by 100% within the past two years.
This is a serious increase, which was also observed in the case of Belarusian internal affairs bodies, as well as the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KDB), also known as KGB, which noted BYN340 million and BYN100 million increases in their budget. Nevertheless, the armed forces enjoy the highest growth in their budget. Even if we take inflation into account, which was expected to rise to 16% in 2022, 2023 marks a 45% increase in the defense budget in real terms. Notably, part of the national security budget devoted to mobilization training also increased by a "modest" 18%, which marks a slight increase in real terms.
The 2024 budget brought an additional BYN0.7 billion increase to the armed forces spending, which means that their budget has increased by 350% since 2018 and 200% since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Note from The Frontelligence Insight: In 2023, the Belarusian Defense Minister announced the acquisition of a Su-30SM from Russia, anticipating its arrival in Belarus shortly. Our team has successfully identified at least two jets believed to be Su-30SM. Although the origin of these aircraft—whether Russian or Belarusian—remains uncertain, it appears that by the end of November 2023, Su-30SM jets were stationed at Baranavichy airfield.
Southern Operational Command
A part of this rise in defense spending will be allocated to creating Southern Operational Command. It is still unclear which areas it will encompass (at least the entire Gomel Oblast), but its creation has a clear goal in mind. To create a military presence near the southeastern border to prepare for a possible conflict in Ukraine. The creation of command was announced in May 2022, but based on open-source research, little has been done since.
In early January 2024, the Radio Svaboda news outlet confirmed unofficial claims that the Belarusian Armed Forces had started building a military camp near Gomel.
Note from The Frontelligence Insight: Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the construction of this facility is unlikely to have a significant impact, with the primary site at the moment covering a mere 650 square meters. Additionally, no facilities capable of accommodating substantial numbers of vehicles or personnel have been identified, making it an improbable candidate for a substantial military facility suitable as a staging area for a large-scale invasion. This supports Rochan Consult's view that the base is not ready, and progress has been overall limited thus far.
Belarusians reportedly allocated RUB500,000 for the works on the camp in 2023 and RUB10 and RUB40 million in 2024 and 2025, respectively. The base is likely to be ready by the end of 2027. Yet, this is the only confirmed development, which indicates that work on strengthening the southern border is ongoing.
While Russia has its Surovikin line, Belarus is creating its version called the Khrenin line (Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin is the defense minister) near Kalinino. The line includes trenches, fortifications, and anti-tank dragon teeth. The line itself is relatively short. As of June, it was around 2 km long. For comparison, the length of the Ukraine-Belarus border is 1,084 km. It is highly likely that Minsk will be developing the line further, but it is unlikely that the entire border will be covered.
Russian presence in Belarus
In many cases, these lessons are taught by Russian personnel, especially the remnants from the Wagner PMC. But interestingly, although these troops train with the Belarusian Armed Forces personnel (artillery and infantry subunits), they are more focused on joint exercises with Belarusian Internal Troops. The main focus is on improving the force's overall capacity to fulfill various missions. For instance, over the past few months, Wagner trained internal troops in a variety of special-tactical missions, such as storming buildings, sniper missions, provision of first aid in a combat environment, using explosives (grenades and anti-personnel mines), etc. What is also noteworthy is that the Commander of the Belarusian Internal Troops, Maj. Gen. Nikolay Karpenkov closely supervises these Wagner-led drills as he regularly observes joint activities.
Note from The Frontelligence Insight:
Satellite imagery comparison reveals a significant reduction in the size of Wagner's camp in Tsel, where Prigozhin and multiple Wagner commanders temporarily stayed before being assassinated in Russia.
Moving beyond Wagner, the presence of conventional Russian forces in Belarus is limited. Moscow still maintains a rather limited air presence in the country. Stationed at the Baranovichi Air Base, these assets form one of the three joint Russo-Belarusian training centers. The other two are in Grodno (air defense) and Mulino (mechanized and tank forces). But more importantly, Russia maintains two S-400 battalions, augmented with several Pantsir-S1 units, in Southern Belarus. These forces are located at the Prybytki and Velikii Bokov air bases and provide an air defense umbrella against Ukrainian missile and air threats. Russians have maintained these forces even after the pullback from Belarus that occurred by mid-2022. We expect S-400s to remain in place at least for the duration of the war in Ukraine but do not expect Russian conventional forces to increase in Belarus. A second attack on Kyiv from the northern is also currently unlikely.
Note from The Frontelligence Insight:
Our team has independently verified the presence of the S-400 in Pribytki, also known as Zyabrovka, aligning with the information presented by Rochan Consulting regarding the deployment of S-400 units in Southern Belarus.
Belarus provided the (air) space and logistics support for the initial invasion force. To this day, Belarus hosts some Russian forces, but these units' size and role have changed significantly over the past two years. It does not mean that the role of Belarus diminished. Quite the opposite. As most of the Russian ground force capability is engaged in Ukraine, Belarus protects Russia's western flank in case of any contingency scenarios with NATO. Especially in terms of Belarus.
Looking into the future
The Belarusian Armed Forces is a mobilization force. They maintain four mechanized brigades, each fielding five battalions (three mechanized and two tanks). Yet, the peacetime posture of these formations means that they are only manned in 30-40%. Mobilization is therefore needed to bring up manning to wartime levels. As we tried to argue in this short piece, the Belarusian military has been busy since February 2022. But what particularly stands out are their efforts to decrease the time needed to reach wartime manning levels. This, combined with the use of UAVs and rigorous study of Russian lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, seeks to prepare Belarus for the demands of the contemporary battlefield.
Yet, the Belarusian Armed Forces continue to display inherent weaknesses. Reliance on Russian doctrine and TTPs is prevalent, leaving little room for indigenous initiative. Equipment fielded is still mostly of Soviet legacy, and although some efforts have been made in recent years to field modern samples, such as modernized T-72s, S-400s, Iskanders, or Su-30SMs, the armed forces are largely obsolete. Although the defense budget keeps increasing, Belarusian priorities are more focused on improving training, mobilization readiness, and slowly building new infrastructure rather than quickly acquiring new hardware. Undoubtedly, Minsk faces defense production bottlenecks. While it can modernize tanks, it does not produce them, and, in this regard, Belarus relies solely on Russia. Russian priorities lie elsewhere, too, as it needs to sustain its operations in Ukraine. Belarus also cannot fight independently as it needs to rely on Russia for key capabilities, such as aviation, robust long-range strike, reconnaissance, etc.
As a result, the likelihood of Belarus entering the war against Ukraine is small. However, given that Minsk is the only part of Russia that can exert pressure on NATO's eastern flank, mostly via hybrid activities, changes occurring within the Belarusian Armed Forces must be observed and analyzed. While Minsk managed not to get militarily involved in Ukraine, it is unlikely to remain on the sidelines in the future war.
Summary note from The Frontelligence Insight:
Our team affirms that there are currently no clear indications or evidence suggesting Belarusian preparations for an invasion of Ukraine. The Russian presence in Belarus remains limited and inadequate to replicate the scenario seen in 2022. While this doesn't guarantee that Belarus won't alter its stance in the near future or that Russia won't decide to invade Kyiv from the North once again, such preparations would not go unnoticed. The concentration of forces in Southern Belarus, coupled with its constrained infrastructure, would definitely attract our attention.
If you found these materials helpful and would like to stay updated on military developments in Belarus, we recommend following Rochan Consulting on Substack.
For our premium subscribers, we've added an extra paragraph, tackling questions about the ammunition situation in Belarus. We've looked into ongoing ammunition transfers and shared insights on how OSINT groups can track significant Russian movements within Belarus, especially if Russia considers re-entering the Kyiv oblast: