Kursk: Russia Prepares Airfields for the Impact

US Grants Permission for ATACMS Strikes inside of Russia

With the recent New York Times report announcing that President Biden has approved Ukraine's use of long-range U.S. missiles to strike targets inside of Russia, discussions about their battlefield impact and potential Russian retaliation have resurfaced again.

As explained in our October report, Russia has multiple logistical and military targets within the ATACMS range, including the airfield in Kursk Oblast, which hosts close-air-support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.

Although the announcement was made only yesterday, evidence suggests that Russia has been working to fortify and expand the airfield since early October. Based on satellite imagery, our analysis shows that new aircraft revetments have been constructed, increasing the airfield's capacity for jets:

The changes are clearly visible when compared to imagery of the same airfield spot from 2022. These newly built revetments offer limited protection, primarily against shrapnel and shockwaves, aiming to minimize damage from missile or drone strikes in the vicinity

The presence of concrete blocks at the construction site suggests ongoing efforts to reinforce the revetments. Satellite imagery shows new concrete blocks added to existing structures, providing an additional layer of protection. It remains unclear whether the Russians intend to add roof coverage or will limit improvements to wall reinforcement.

Unfortunately, given that the permission to strike was leaked and publicly announced, it is likely to limit the potential damage Ukrainian forces can inflict. While similar construction activities have been noted at only one other airfield so far, our team anticipates this trend will spread to other airfields in the near future.

Ukraine will face multiple challenges in using ATACMS as well as Storm Shadow/SCALP effectively, mainly due to limited salvo rates and significant interception rates, which reduce the likelihood of consistently successful strikes.

ATACMS missiles vary in range and warhead type. Some are equipped with unitary warheads, while others use submunitions. As a result, certain hard targets, like bridges, won’t be effectively destroyed by submunition-equipped missiles, limiting the number of targets Ukraine can engage. Not all variants of ATACMS can reach targets 300 kilometers away or effectively penetrate hardened defenses. Additionally, due to the risks involved, the missiles cannot be launched from the frontlines and must be fired from greater distances.

There are also significant uncertainties about whether Ukraine will be permitted to strike Russian oil refineries or energy infrastructure, given U.S. opposition to similar operations in the past. It is likely that critical infrastructure is excluded from the targets Ukraine is authorized to hit.

Given the potential risk that Ukraine may not receive further shipments of ATACMS from the U.S., it will need to be wise not only in selecting targets but also in timing. Areas with heavy air defense saturation could require multiple missile launches to achieve even a few successful strikes: something Ukraine cannot afford in such a situation. Hence, while ATACMS will certainly provide tactical advantages on the battlefield, expectations should be tempered. Their impact is unlikely to drastically alter the course of the war or cause major damage to Russian or North Korean-linked forces in Kursk. Instead, their use will likely result in incremental tactical gains, rather than immediate or decisive operational or strategic outcomes.