Frontline Dynamics 2025: Key Updates & Developments

Early Assessments

Despite Ukraine’s recent improvements in unit structure, recruitment approaches, and leadership decisions, the battlefield situation remains complicated, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk areas. Structural changes take time to yield tangible effects, and until they do, Ukraine is likely to face continued pressure and setbacks.

Russian forces are sustaining heavy losses, with tens of thousands of active cases of AWOL and desertion documented across multiple units. However, they continue advancing in multiple areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched thin due to manpower shortages and where Russia has been able to concentrate superior numbers.

Meanwhile, Russia is reinforcing key military infrastructure, particularly in response to Ukrainian drone strikes that have successfully targeted airfields and ammunition depots. These efforts suggest an ongoing adaptation to Ukrainian tactics, though they also add to the growing financial strain of the war.

Contents:

I. Key Findings
II. Frontline Update
a) Chasiv Yar
b) Toretsk
c) Pokrovsk
d) Velyka Novosilka
e) Kupyansk
III. Military Infrastructure Adaptations
Endnotes

I. Key Findings

• Russian forces are facing an increasing shortage of armored vehicles. Over the past month, our team has tracked military vehicle movements in frontline rear areas and Russian bases, noting a further decline in the presence of traditional armored vehicles such as tanks and BMPs. Instead, there has been a marked increase in the use of improvised civilian vehicles, including SUVs and trucks modified for combat.

• According to multiple sources in the Ukrainian military, whose statements we consistently cross-examine, Ukraine has arguably achieved firepower parity with Russia in several frontline areas, primarily due to the extensive use of drones. In some cases, Ukrainian forces have even gained an advantage. Given that the majority of battlefield losses are now inflicted by drones, this capability has helped offset Russia’s dominance in artillery. However, despite this parity, Ukraine continues to lose ground, as a shortage of manpower on defensive positions enables Russian forces to advance, even when firepower is balanced. While we lack independent data to fully verify these claims, they align with our broader observations and those of war monitors.

• Despite persistent logistical problems, morale issues, and questions over competency within the Russian military command, their advances are unlikely to significantly slow down immediately. The fundamental issue remains that Ukraine’s forces are stretched thin, lacking sufficient frontline infantry to halt Russian progress across the entire front.

• Russia focuses on securing control over the T0504 highway, which runs through Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, and Bakhmut. Given the concentration of Russian forces in these sectors, we assess that a major offensive against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk is unlikely until this defensive line is entirely occupied.

• The Pokrovsk direction remains a primary focus for the Russian command. However, our team has also marked significant force concentrations in the Kursk and Kupyansk areas, indicating that these areas also hold elevated military and political importance.

• We have documented the movement of North Korean equipment and likely personnel both inside Russia and near the front lines. Additionally, a few reports we have received indicate that North Korean troops should be expected to reengage in combat operations soon. Based on these observations, we assess that there is no withdrawal of North Korean forces from the war entirely; rather, they are undergoing a rotation or replenishment of losses.

• Russian forces are reinforcing their airfields against strikes and building new makeshift ammunition depots with enhanced camouflage and protective measures.

II. Frontline Assessment

a) Chasiv Yar

Chasiv Yar’s geographical location, with a water channel splitting the town, made it an advantageous defensive position. While our team initially anticipated its fall in 2024, Ukrainian forces managed to regroup and reinforce their defenses after significant setbacks earlier in 2024 that nearly jeopardized the entire town's defense. As of this report, however, the final phase of its defense is drawing to a close, and the full occupation of Chasiv Yar appears imminent.

In our assessment, after the city's defense was reorganized in 2024, the town’s strong defensive position could have lasted much longer, but a chronic shortage of infantry and combat-ready reserves has limited the defense's sustainability. Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne Regiment, part of the 98th Airborne Division, have already captured the majority of key positions within Chasiv Yar. While a Ukrainian counterattack cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely that Russian forces will face a significant pushback, and we expect them to expand their foothold on the western side of the channel.

Though Chasiv Yar itself was a crucial barrier to Kostyantynivka, Slovyansk, and Kramators'k, it would be misleading to suggest that the path to these cities is now entirely clear. Several defensive positions, like Stupochky and other smaller towns on the approach to Kostyantynivka, are likely to slow down Russian advances. These areas will present significant obstacles, slowing progress and likely inflicting higher casualties on Russian forces, making a swift, low-loss advance to Kostyantynivka improbable.

Despite significant Russian losses during the battle for Chasiv Yar, we still foresee the potential for further advances toward Kostyantynivka town and the Kurdyumivka area. Even if Russian forces suffer additional losses, as long as they maintain a numerical advantage and the will to push forward, we see no reason to believe their progress will halt at Chasiv Yar.

b) Toretsk

Russian operational grouping "Center" continues its offensive in the Toretsk area with units from the 51st Combined Arms Army, focused on gaining full control of the town. Currently, Russian forces have successfully advanced into the westernmost sections of Toretsk. For the past week, the town has seen some of the most intense combat, driven not only by fierce urban battles but also by the concentrated use of Russian air power, which has deployed KAB bombs in large numbers - often releasing dozens per day.

Despite these gains, Ukrainian forces have carried out several successful counterattacks, reclaiming small parts of the town. However, the ongoing destruction of urban infrastructure, just like it happened in Avdiivka, has made it increasingly problematic to maintain effective defenses.

We anticipate that Russian forces may attempt to reach the highway south of Kostyantynivka while also advancing north from Toretsk, to cut off Ukrainian units near the Kurdyumivka area. Given that Russian forces have already crossed the canal in Chasiv Yar, there is a strong possibility they will push forward from both directions simultaneously, attempting to encircle Ukrainian defenders and force a retreat toward the strategic highway connecting Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Bakhmut.

c) Pokrovsk

We believe that capturing Pokrovsk remains one of the key objectives for Russian forces in 2025. This is evident from the intensity of their attacks and the substantial concentration of forces, including units from the 90th Tank Division, 2nd, and 41st Combined Arms Army, reinforced by additional regiments and battalions from other units.

Tactically, Russian forces are trying to advance north toward Hryshyne to sever the supply lines to Pokrovsk, which are already being targeted by Russian drones. Additionally, they are pushing along the railroad to reach the western part of Pokrovsk. To support their movement toward Hryshyne and the western flank of Pokrovsk, Russian forces are attempting to concentrate infantry in the Kotlyne area.

According to our sources on the ground, Russian forces have already begun making inroads into Zvirove, a outskirts settlement at the edge of Pokrovsk. Given the dense, continuous urban stretch from Zvirove to Pokrovsk, the two areas essentially form one large town. If Russian forces succeed in Zvirove, they would be able to push deeper into Pokrovsk with greater ease.

Three key factors are making the defense of Pokrovsk increasingly difficult: FPV drones, artillery, and gliding bombs. While Ukraine can target enemy artillery, the dangers created by drones and gliding bombs remain significant. Ukraine lacks effective countermeasures against gliding bombs, and FPV drones connected via fiber optic cables are not susceptible to electronic warfare jamming.

According to our sources, civilians remain in Pokrovsk, despite ongoing targeting by Russian FPV drones, which engage any moving vehicle in the town. Russian FPV teams are reportedly targeting areas such as crossroads, where vehicles slow down. Recently, a civilian truck transporting bread was targeted. Multiple streets on the outskirts of the town are unsafe due to constant drone patrols hunting for movement. Even large, seemingly empty buildings are targeted by drones. The situation mirrors Avdiivka's last year but with much larger drone numbers. Compounding the problem, there are thousands of civilians, estimated at around 7,000, without electricity or water.

However, Russian forces face setbacks in the south of Pokrovsk. Since the fall of last year, the Ukrainian 25th Airborne Brigade has successfully held Lysivka, securing the southern and southeastern flanks of Pokrovsk and preventing Russian forces from advancing into the town from that direction. While the map may appear static in this region, this is not due to a lack of Russian efforts, but rather the result of a well-organized defense by the 25th Brigade.

d) Velyka Novosilka

Velyka Novosilka, recently seized by Russian forces, previously served as a key defensive node, particularly during Ukraine's summer counteroffensive in 2023 and subsequent battles in the region. By 2024, Velyka Novosilka had lost its earlier importance. Still, it remained a key defensive position in the area and had a network of small rivers that formed natural barriers against advancing forces.

More importantly, the capture of Velyka Novosilka opens several operational options for Russian forces. They could push deeper into Donetsk Oblast, threatening Ukrainian rear positions, or shift their offensive westward into Zaporizhzhia Oblast, threatening the Ukrainian flank. That being said, unless Ukrainian forces fail to organize a cohesive defense and secure sufficient manpower, as was the case in the Pokrovsk area during the summer of 2024, any Russian advance northward could be complicated. The geographical conditions in the region favor defenders, potentially slowing further movement.

The fall of Velyka Novosilka is unlikely to significantly alter the overall dynamics in the Donetsk sector.

e) Dvorichna area

The situation near Dvorichna in the Kupyansk area remains complicated for Ukrainian defenders. Russian forces have not only crossed the Oskil River but also established a foothold on its right bank near Dvorichna and advanced into the settlement itself. This move allows Russian troops to increase pressure on Kupyansk from the north. Given the concentration of forces in the area, it is evident that the command of Russia’s 6th Combined Arms Army is seeking to expand its presence near Dvorichna while simultaneously pushing toward Kupyansk.

Given the significant concentration of forces near Kupyansk, including elements of the 1st Tank Army, our team assesses that Russian forces are preparing for a direct assault on the city. The scale of this buildup indicates that securing Kupyansk is a high-priority objective for the Russian military command.

Overall, our team is concerned about the situation in Kupyansk and sees a real possibility of rapid deterioration in the coming period.

III. Military Infrastructure Adaptations

Frontelligence Insight continues to track infrastructure developments across Russia. In addition to the expansion of training facilities in the Far East, which coincided with the arrival of North Korean troops, we have previously reported on other significant projects, including the reinforcement of Russian airfields.

During the construction of what we identify as ammunition and drone storage sites, Russian forces appear to be employing better fortification methods compared to the past to improve resilience against attacks. This shift is likely a response to the increasing success of Ukrainian drone strikes, which have effectively targeted and destroyed depots in locations such as Toropets, Tikhoretsk, and Bryansk Oblast.

In this particular case, we are observing the construction of multiple reinforced hangars at the Krymsk airfield in Krasnodar Krai, roughly 300 kilometers from the frontline. Given past Ukrainian strikes on Russian airfields, such measures are unsurprising. While these structures will likely aid Russian forces in concealing aircraft operations and protection, they also result in increasing financial burden. The ongoing expansion of airfield infrastructure, along with warehouse fortifications and other defensive measures, adds to the mounting costs of war. Taken together with other factors, this suggests that Ukraine’s drone campaign is achieving at least partial success: not only through direct strikes but also by forcing Russia into increasingly expensive countermeasures.

Endnotes

In summary, our team holds a cautiously pessimistic view of Ukraine’s short-term battlefield prospects. Nonetheless, we are closely tracking recent changes initiated by Ukrainian leadership, including the conversion to corps-level formations and the halt in recruitment for new brigades, with a focus on reinforcing existing units and revamping the training system.

These positive changes, combined with successful drone strikes targeting Russian territory, lay the groundwork for potential improvements in Ukraine’s position. More importantly, it appears Ukrainian leadership is seriously trying to rebuild public trust in the military: an essential component for boosting recruitment.

With the uncertainty introduced by the new U.S. presidential administration, our team refrains from making concrete forecasts. Fundamentally, neither Russia nor Ukraine currently possesses the resources to fully achieve their strategic objectives, and high levels of AWOL on both sides make it doubtful that either side is prepared to sustain this war for another three to four years.