Fronteline Analysis: A Concise Look at Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Avdiivka Area

Today's special analysis by Frontelligence Insight explains the reasons behind Russian advances across multiple sectors of the frontline and explores the implications of these developments. Focusing on Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Ocheretyne, this report aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current situation.

CONTENTS

I. Avdiivka Area
II. Chasiv Yar
III. Kurakhove
IV. Accumulation of Problems
V. The Outlook

I. Avdiivka Area

After Avdiivka fell under Russian control, there was a concern that Russian forces would continue their rapid westward advance towards hastily constructed defensive lines. However, after two months of intense battles and heavy losses, the Russians were finally able to penetrate Ukrainian defenses in Ocheretyne, a town located approximately 10km northeast of Avdiivka - Ukrainian forces were forced to retreat from both Ocheretne and Solovyove. Several Ukrainian military bloggers familiar with the situation expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of brigade leadership. Our team also spoke with multiple individuals who echoed similar sentiments—citing issues with organization, coordination with neighboring units, and communication.

While these anecdotal reports are important, our team believes that many brigades are currently not combat-ready. Some brigades have not undergone proper rotation for two years, and even when they have, they have received minimal vehicle and heavy equipment replacements. This is due to much of the equipment from the 2023 aid being allocated to newly formed units that participated in the summer counter-offensive. Given the Russian forces' advantages in personnel, artillery, vehicles, and air support along the frontline, it is not surprising that certain areas were penetrated.

The overall situation in the area is difficult, as Ukraine lacks mobile reserves to effectively counter situations like this, allowing the Russians to fortify their positions in the newly seized settlements and establish a bridgehead for further advancements.

II. CHASIV YAR

As previously detailed in our special report for paid subscribers, Russian forces have concentrated their capable and motivated units towards Chasiv Yar, including most of the combat units of the 98th Guards Airborne Division. This concentration of effective units not only indicates a priority for the Russian command but also suggests the formation of offensive potential—a gathering of forces and resources to create a breach in a narrow segment of the frontline, in line with fundamental military theory.

Our assessment suggests that Russian forces are aiming to flank Chasiv Yar while simultaneously launching a frontal assault, similar to their approaches in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. They appear to be targeting vulnerabilities in specific areas to exploit them further. Frontelligence Insight has also reported additional Russian troop deployments to reinforce existing forces in the area, with a particular focus expected on the southern and northern sectors of Chasiv Yar. The collective concentration of forces in this area exceeds the scale of one corps.

If Chasiv Yar falls to Russia, particularly in the southern part, they could advance towards Kostyantynivka, which would in turn disrupt logistics for the force south of Bakhmut. This development could be considered realistic, as the Russians have focused a lot of their efforts on the southern flank. Furthermore, as our team mentioned earlier, they have made substantial progress in the southern flank of the forest area, heading toward the landbridge.

Ocheretyne in the Avdiivka area plays an important factor here as well, as the Russians have multiple options on how to act. They can either move towards Pokrovs'k or north and block important crossroads south of Kostyantynivka. This would be a serious problem, as it would cut off tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops from logistics.

While it will be difficult for the Russians to reach this goal, in the current situation, this is a realistic risk that Ukraine might face if the Russians have success both in Chasiv Yar and beyond Ocheretyne.

III. Kurakhove

Another clear objective for the Russians is to sever Kurakhove, a vital logistical hub that supplies Ukrainian forces in Vuhledar and its surroundings. Russian forces will likely attempt to bypass Kurakhove from the north to establish fire control over the main road connecting to the town. The loss of Kurakhove could place the entire grouping of forces in the Vuhledar area at significant risk, as it would enable the Russians to sever another logistics route to Vuhledar and potentially advance towards the town from the north—a worst-case scenario for the defenders.

To complete this task, Russians have concentrated approximately force equal to 4 brigades. The set goals and a number of concentrated forces indicate their confidence to exploit the current unfavorable situation to reach ambitious operational goals. So why did Ukraine end up in this situation?

IV. Accumulation of Problems

The current situation reflects the culmination of longstanding issues, which have now surfaced like uncompressed metal springs, manifesting in problems that Ukraine faces. One critical issue is the lack of timely mobilization efforts. As Frontelligence Insight accurately predicted in the earlier analysis, the mobilization law was signed in the latter half of April and will only come into effect 30 days after its official release, on May 18th. While specific numbers cannot be disclosed, it's evident that certain Ukrainian brigades are now operating at less than 40% of their original capacity, both in terms of personnel and available vehicles.

Delayed Western aid has also played a detrimental role. It’s hard to run mobilization and training without adequate vehicles and weaponry. While basic training can be conducted with domestic efforts, specialized training, such as for operating specific vehicles like the M113, M777, or M2 Bradley, becomes difficult when the necessary equipment is unavailable or its arrival is uncertain. That being said, when the fate of Ukraine is decided on the battlefield, the necessary adjustments to mobilization laws could have been implemented much earlier. Our team also assesses that the provided aid will eventually help stabilize the frontlines but may not be sufficient to support large-scale offensives.

Another critical issue, exemplified by Ocheretyne, is the lack of proper fortifications and preparations. There was nothing to prevent the Ministry of Defense and General Staff from organizing the construction of robust defensive lines behind Avdiivka when the Russians made their initial gains in October-November. Today, basic trench construction is insufficient due to the heavy saturation of airspace with munition-dropping and kamikaze drones. Proper fortifications now require top cover on dugouts and trenches, concrete structures, and nets to counter drone threats. For instance, Russian dugouts built "L" shaped entrances to minimize damage from kamikaze drones. These efforts are beyond what undermanned brigades can accomplish on their own. Unfortunately, as we previously highlighted, understaffed brigades lacking adequate resources were tasked with fortification preparations, resulting in subpar outcomes.

V. THE OUTLOOK

But can the Russians realistically achieve these goals within this year? Military theory suggests that once defenses are breached, mechanized units exploit the breach and advance into the "operational space"—a geographical area where units can maneuver freely to achieve operational objectives. However, due to losses in vehicles and challenges with frontline logistics, the Russian army is unlikely to conduct deep strikes into Ukrainian territory, similar to those seen during the initial invasion period in 2022. Instead, they are likely to focus on attempts to envelop Ukrainian forces.

The situation on the frontline is expected to stabilize with the arrival of new ammunition, weaponry, and freshly mobilized but trained recruits. Nevertheless, stabilization is not anticipated immediately, as it will take time to arm, train, and prepare new recruits. Considering that the new mobilization law takes effect in the second half of May and requires time for mobilization and training, stabilization may not be achieved before the fall of 2024.

The situation should be taken seriously, given that the Russian military retains a reserve force equivalent to at least two corps, which could be deployed anywhere, including in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, or to reinforce existing axes of advance if vulnerabilities are identified. Despite the challenging outlook for Ukraine, it's important to recognize that Russian ambitions and plans outlined by their general staff do not necessarily dictate the future. Their objectives to seize Pokrovsk or Kurakhove may fail to materialize this year, or if successful, they may lose significant offensive capabilities, reverting to warfare of small tactical groups for localized gains. Consequently, their goal of capturing the entire Donbas region may be unattainable in the foreseeable future. This could lead to a reassessment of their end goals and potentially reduce their willingness to sustain the war.