Desertions and Loss Ratios: Trends and Forecasts
Special Report on AWOL Numbers and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
Contents:
Intro
I. Absent Without Official Leave - Desertion Cases
II. Impact Assessment
III. Loss Trends and Analysis
Historically, when both sides in a war experience high AWOL rates, it signals mounting exhaustion - not just in their ability to hold defensive lines but also to sustain offensive operations. In such situation, as the rule, neither side can achieve a decisive victory nor suffer a total collapse without a fundamental shift in balance.
In recent months, growing AWOL rates in Ukraine have drawn significant attention, becoming a serious concern both in Ukraine and abroad. The issue became particularly visible with the newly formed 155th Brigade, which was armed and trained in France. The brigade’s high AWOL numbers sparked an international scandal and led to criminal investigations against senior officers of the brigade.
Because Ukraine relies on foreign aid and operates within a democratic framework, information about its military problems - including AWOL rates are more accessible than similar data from Russia. This creates a perception that the problem is uniquely Ukrainian. However, our team has gathered multiple documents, data sheets, and reports from Russian units to provide a clearer estimate of AWOL cases across both sides. Furthermore, by combining this data with various loss estimates, we were able to assess the current balance, draw comparisons, and tried to project the war’s trajectory by determining how close either side may be to reaching a breaking point.
Here’s what we found.
I. Absent Without Official Leave - Desertion Cases
Thanks to Inform Napalm: a Ukrainian OSINT community known for its reliable investigations since 2014, we have a screenshot of a slide from an internal Russian presentation detailing AWOL and desertion cases. The presentation specifically focused on AWOL cases that led to criminal prosecution, with a footnote noting that some units fail to properly prosecute such incidents.
While the slide did not include the total number of AWOL cases as a single numeric value, it provided both a percentage and the corresponding numeric figure for that percentage. This allowed us to calculate the overall number of AWOL cases in Russia, as well as break them down by military district.
As evident in the translated graph, the highest number of prosecuted AWOL cases, though not the highest percentage, occurs in the Southern Military District - 11966 cases. This is unsurprising, given that it is the largest district and includes the so-called 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now known as the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively), which were formed from Russian proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk.
These units largely consist of forcibly mobilized local residents from occupied territories. Additionally, we have a separate spreadsheet with more detailed data on Southern Military District, which will be presented further in this report.
Through simple calculations, as demonstrated in the image, we determined the total number of desertion and AWOL cases in the Southern Military District, arriving at a figure of 22,577 cases.
The Central Military District ranks second in total AWOL and desertion cases. It is the largest military district in Russia by geographic size and includes major formations such as the 41st Guards Combined Arms Army, the 25th Combined Arms Army, and the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army.
The total number of AWOL and desertion cases in the Central Military District was determined to be 13,769
Following that is the Moscow Military District, home to major units such as the 20th Guards Army and the 6th and 4th Tank Brigades, with a total of 7,178 AWOL and desertion cases across the district.
Both the Eastern Military District and the Leningrad Military District report similar AWOL/Desertion numbers, each exceeding 3,000 cases. However, their approach to criminal proceedings differs significantly.
The Eastern Military District initiated criminal proceedings in 86% of cases, while the Leningrad Military District pursued charges in only 13.5%.
After compiling AWOL case figures from each military district, we arrived at the following totals:
Southern Military District: 22,577
Moscow Military District: 7,778
Leningrad Military District: 3,052
Eastern Military District: 3,378
Central Military District: 13,769
This brings the overall number of documented AWOL cases across these districts to 50,554.
Another leaked document (available for download at the end of this report), listing the full names and details of tens of thousands of AWOL soldiers in the Southern Military District, provided more detailed insight into desertion trends. The 1st and 2nd Army Corps - formed from mobilized and proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk, make up 58.8% of all desertion cases in the district. The 58th Army, with units currently deployed along the southern front near Orikhiv, also ranks high with 2682 cases.
According to the Excel spreadsheet from the Southern Military District, the vast majority of registered desertions occurred between 2023 and 2024, with relatively few cases recorded in 2022. This discrepancy helps explain the gap between the desertion and AWOL figures in this database and the official data presented in a separate slide presented earlier, which listed 22,577 cases - significantly higher than the 19,210 recorded in the Southern Military District spreadsheet.
II. Impact Assessment
According to the U.S. Army Research Institute Special Report 51, "What We Know About AWOL and Desertion," by Peter F. Ramsberger and D. Bruce Bell (August 2002), the percentage of deserters within the enlisted U.S. Army force during the Vietnam War period at 1968–1971 averaged around 5%. While this rate is comparable to current Russian desertion levels, it does not indicate a total military collapse or a breakdown in command authority.
For comparison, the Russian Imperial Army at the end of World War I on the Eastern Front saw desertion rates climb into the double digits, resulting in its collapse, thus these numbers do not yet signal the kind of systemic collapse seen in 1917.
Assessing publicly the situation within the Ukrainian military is more difficult for our team, as we cannot disclose the specific numbers we have. However, we can indicate that Ukraine’s AWOL and desertion figures currently exceed those reported on the Russian side - though with several key caveats.
First, until recent reforms streamlined the transfer process, it was not uncommon for Ukrainian soldiers to leave their units without authorization to join a preferred unit, rather than waiting for an official transfer that could take months. This has inflated AWOL statistics
Second, Ukraine has implemented a successful reintegration program, allowing some deserters to return to service without severe penalties. This initiative has helped recover personnel who might have otherwise been permanently lost.
That said, Ukraine faces a more pressing manpower challenge than Russia. With a population at least three times smaller, Ukraine lacks the ability to absorb AWOL and desertion losses as easily. While Russia can sustain its offensive efforts despite these losses, Ukraine does not have the same luxury
III. Loss Trends and Analysis
When assessing manpower losses, estimates vary significantly. OSINT projects that track losses by name tend to produce the most conservative figures, as they require direct verification,. Meanwhile, both Ukraine and Russia provide inflated enemy casualty reports while downplaying their own losses. U.S. intelligence assessments, based on classified sources, generally fall somewhere in the middle. Our team’s estimates align closely with those provided by the U.S. government, with some minor differences.
Our estimates for losses follow a specific guideline:
- We account for KIA (Killed in Action), MIA (Missing in Action), deserters, and WIA (Wounded in Action).
- For WIA, we include only those who are severely wounded and highly unlikely to return to service. Lightly or temporarily wounded personnel are excluded since they often recover and rejoin the fight within weeks or months, sometimes multiple times. Including them would distort the assessment of actual force exhaustion.
Based on this approach, we estimate that Russia has lost approximately 210,000 KIA, with another 200,000 severely wounded. When factoring in MIA (who are likely dead but remain unidentified) and deserters, the total number of permanently lost personnel falls between 460,000 and 560,000. This figure would be close to a million if we included all wounded, but excluding those with recoverable injuries and returning to service provides a clearer picture of manpower depletion in a war of attrition. We also excluded those who were forcibly returned to service after desertion, accounting for approximately 15% to 25% of all desertion cases.
On the Ukrainian side, we estimate KIA and MIA numbers at roughly half of Russia’s - around 90,000. When factoring in permanently crippled and deserters, the total number of losses falls around 300,000. Higher desertion and AWOL numbers, make the overall loss picture less optimistic than if only KIA and seriously wounded figures were considered.
Since the Ukrainian military has a more effective system for evacuation, stabilization, and treatment, the ratio of killed to injured is significantly better on the Ukrainian side, as more wounded soldiers survive. However, when it comes to irrecoverable battlefield injuries - such as amputations and other severe wounds that result in permanent disability medical treatment plays a lesser role, as only a small number of those with such injuries return to the battlefield.
Even using the estimate of 560,000 Russian losses against 300,000 Ukrainian losses, the loss ratio still stands at 1 : 1.87
While these numbers might appear as favorable for Ukraine, there is a fundamental issue - Ukraine’s smaller mobilization base and poor mobilization campaign. Given that Russia’s population is at least three times larger, and their recruitment system is better, Ukraine’s preferable loss ratio should be at least 1:3, rather than the 1:1.86 ratio reflected in current estimates.
With a 1:1.86 loss ratio and current AWOL figures, the war still favors more Russia - not due to decisive victories, but because it can outlast Ukraine in manpower. At the same time, in the near term, a stalemate remains the most probable outcome, unless Ukraine improves the loss ratio to at least 1:3 or secures game-changing external support. In the mid to long term, Ukraine risks moving from a stalemate into more significant operational losses on the battlefield with an increasing risk of strategic defeat.
Another big problem, which benefits Russia more - force generation. When it comes to recruitment estimate they fluctuate between 20,000 and 40,000 per month, depending on the period, with a notable surge reported during the Kursk operation as more Russians signed contracts.
Even under the most conservative estimates of Russian recruitment and the most optimistic casualty figures, Russia remains capable of sustaining its force generation over time - not only replacing losses but also forming new units. In contrast, despite lower overall losses, Ukraine struggles to match this capacity due to significantly lower recruitment numbers.
However, this trend isn’t strictly linear. Over time, the age and quality of recruits decline, while recruitment payouts continue to rise, creating an increasingly unfavorable cost-benefit dynamic. While more Russian soldiers are being permanently removed from service due to severe injuries or death, necessitating more frequent replenishment, Russia’s larger mobilization pool and effective recruitment campaign helps offset these challenges, something Ukraine simply cannot match.
Strictly from a manpower dynamics perspective, our team holds a negative outlook for Ukraine after 6-12 months, unless a significant factor increases recruitment numbers in Ukraine and drives up Russian casualties.
Special thanks to Michael Kofman for conducting a peer review
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The copy of the file is available on the Telegram Channel Мобилизаця ДНР Live as well as by the direct link below in the paid section, where you can also find more data on our methodology and verification